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In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code published the Preliminary Report of the PEB
Study Group on Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.' In
this three-year project, the Study Group attempted to identify
major problems of practical importance in Article 2 and to rec-
ommend possible revisions. The Study Group solicited comments
from over three hundred interested persons and organizations
and received over fifty responses. In March 1991, the Study
Group submitted an Executive Summary to the PEB and unani-
mously recommended the revision of Article 2 and the appoint-
ment of a Drafting Committee by the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws.! A Drafting Committee,
to which I serve as Reporter, first met in December 1991. As of
April 1994, the Committee has held seven meetings, each well
attended by Commissioners and a diverse and increasingly inter-
ested group of representatives and observers.' The first reading
* Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. I
serve as Reporter to the Drafting Committee of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Law which is charged with revising Article 2, Sales, of the
Uniform Commercial Code. In this Article, I have tried to report without extensive
elaboration some of the revisions to Article 2, Part 2 which have been approved in
principle by the Drafting Committee as of December 21, 1993. Comments, criticisms,
and suggestions are welcome, and should be mailed to me at Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law, 357 E. Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60611.
1. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB
STUDY GROUP UNIFORMi COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2, PRELIMINARY REPORT (1990)
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT]. The Preliminary Report has been reprinted under
the title, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981 (1991) [hereinafter
Appraisal]. The Appraisal also contains a critical evaluation of the Preliminary Re-
port by a Task Force of the A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk
Transfers, and Documents of Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code.
2. For a copy of the Executive Summary, see PEB Study Group: Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Article 2 Executive Summary, 46 BUS. LAW. 1869 (1991) [hereinafter
Executive Summary].
3. In the early meetings of the Drafting Committee, the Reporter prepared an
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of parts of the revised statute will occur at the annual meeting
of the National Conference in August 1994. The Committee
should complete the revision project by August 1996.4
In this Essay, I will give a progress report on the revision of
Article 2, Part 2, dealing with the form, formation, and readjust-
ment of contracts for the sale of goods. I will discuss the draft
revision of December 21, 1993, which the Drafting Committee
has approved in principle.5
II. PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
A. The Structure and Limited Scope of Article 2, Part 2
1. The Restatement Formula
A formation dispute arises when one party withdraws from
negotiations over a proposed exchange and claims that the nego-
tiations have not created an enforceable contract. If this claim is
correct, either party can withdraw for any reason without liabili-
ty for breach. Except for limited cases of pre-contractual liability
or where option contracts exist, if the negotiating parties have
not crossed the formation line, they have a "safe harbor" within
which they are free from contract.6 Understanding where the
issue agenda derived from the Preliminary Report, the Executive Summary, and
other relevant material for each part of Article 2. The Committee discussed and
sometimes debated these issues, either reached a consensus or took a vote, and gave
drafting directions to the Reporter. The Committee completed this work in April
1993. As of January 1994, the Drafting Committee had discussed tentative revisions
of Parts 1 through 6. The revision of Part 7 was considered at the March 1994
meeting.
4. In addition to the National Conference, the revision must work its way
through the American Law Institute (ALI). The ALI Member's Consultative Group on
Article 2, Sales, has had two meetings, the first in November 1990 on the Prelimi-
nary Report and the second in September 1993 on the proposed "hub and spoke"
reorganization of Articles 2, 2A, and transfers in information technology. The Consul-
tative Group will hold additional meetings, followed by a full-scale review of the
completed revision by the members of the ALI and the Executive Council.
5. Copies of this draft are available from the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, 676 N. St. Clair Street, Suite 1700, Chicago, Illinois
60611, telephone (312) 915-0195.
6. The Code imposes a duty of good faith upon contract performance and enforce-
ment. The duty does not extend to pre-contract negotiations. See U.C.C. § 1-203
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line between freedom from contract and liability for breach is
drawn is therefore important.7
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts'" organizing principle
for contract formation is that "the formation of a contract re-
quires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual
assent to the exchange and a consideration."9 Chapter 3 spins
out elaborate rules on such topics as "manifestation of assent,"
the "making" and "acceptance" of offers, and the "duration of the
offeree's power of acceptance.""0 Chapter 4 then treats the "re-
quirement of consideration" and alternative theories for contract
liability based on reliance and restitution." Where parties pro-
pose bargains, however, the Restatement formula is clear: Offer
plus Acceptance plus Consideration equals Contract. 2
2. The Scope of Part 2
Article 2 also deals with a bargain, the contract for sale of
goods."3 The organizing principles for contract formation and
modification in Part 2, however, are less complete than those in
the Restatement. Whether a withdrawing party is within the
"safe harbor" may depend upon the application of both Part 2
and the Restatement or common law rules.
(1990); see also Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game
Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990) (utilizing
economic analysis of law and applied game theory to demonstrate that parties' at-
tempts to maximize their returns most affect and control pre-contract negotiations).
7. See generally Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 269, 271-91 (1986) (providing an analysis of current theories of contractual
obligations).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS vii (1979). The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts was adopted in 1979, well after virtually every state had enacted Article
2. For discussion purposes, I will use the Restatement (Second) as a surrogate for
the common law of contracts.
9. Id. § 17(1).
10. See id. §§ 18-70.
11. See id. §§ 71-109.
12. This formula has not changed much in 30 years. See generally Robert
Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE L.J. 302 (1964).
13. See U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1990). The broad phrase "contract for sale" includes the
exchange, whether present or future, of title to goods for a price. Id.
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For example, the statute of frauds in section 2-201 is preemp-
tive, 4 but section 2-205, dealing with "firm offers," supplements
rather than displaces consideration and reliance as grounds to
create option contracts. 5 Absent a "firm offer," Article 2 does
not deal directly with the timing of option contract formation.
Similarly, section 2-204 states general, flexible principles of con-
tract formation that do not seem to depend upon the traditional
requirements of consideration and offer and acceptance.'" But
the concept of consideration is embedded in the requirement of
agreement'7 and offer and acceptance are still important ways
to "show agreement" under section 2-204(1)."8 Yet Part 2 does
not define the word "offer" and although sections 2-206 and 2-
207 elaborate on the method and manner of "acceptance," Part 2
says nothing about when an offer or an acceptance is effective or
when an attempt to revoke an offer beats an attempt to accept
one.'" Furthermore, section 2-209(1) provides that an
"agreement modifying a contract.., needs no consideration to
be binding 20 without stating what else, if anything, is required,
and section 2-209(2) validates a "no oral modification" clause
without specifying what types of waiver a party may invoke to
delete it.2' Also missing in action is the concept of reliance as
14. See id. § 2-201(1).
15. See id. § 2-205; D.A. Elia Constr. Corp. v. Lyco, Inc., No. CIV-89-232E, 1991
WL 128733 (W.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991), amendment denied, No. CIV-89-232E, 1991 WL
224434 (W.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 963 F.2d 1521 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that promissory
estoppel may hold a construction bid open); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-4 (3d ed. 1988).
16. See U.C.C. § 2-204 (1990).
17. The U.C.C. defines "agreement" as the "bargain of the parties in fact." Id.
§ 1-201(3). Although the U.C.C. does not define "bargain," § 3 of the Restatement de-
fines the term as an "agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for
a performance or to exchange performances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 3 (1979). Because the exchange of goods for a price invariably will be "bargained
for" within § 71(2) of the Restatement, sales within Article 2 will have consideration.
18. See Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1114-16 (1st Cir. 1993).
19. But see U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1990), which provides that in most cases "an
offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance . . . by any medi-
um reasonable in the circumstances." Arguably, this means that if a party sends an
acceptance by a reasonable medium, the Code will consider the offer accepted at the
time sent.
20. Id. § 2-209(1).
21. Id. § 2-209(2).
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an alternative to or a component of the bargain theory of liabili-
ty.22
Some provisions in Part 2 do not deal with contract formation
or modification at allP and at least one provision dealing with
contract formation is not in Part 2.24 Thus, section 2-202 deals
with what terms are part of an integrated written contract,
25
section 2-208 assesses the effect of a course of performance un-
der a contract,26 and section 2-210 deals with efforts to assign
rights and delegate duties arising under an otherwise en-
forceable contract.2 ' A section that could have been included in
Part 2 but was not is section 2-302, which provides a defense
against the enforcement of an unconscionable contract or clause.
In sum, Article 2, Part 2 is an innovative but incomplete
statement of the bargain theory of contract formation and modi-
fication for the law of sales. As a code in the common law tra-
dition, however, it depends upon the common law principles that
it does not otherwise displace to fill in the gaps.2' These com-
mon law principles now find coherent expression in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, upon which the courts frequently
rely.29 Over time, this marriage of convenience between Article
22. For a criticism of this omission, see Michael Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Arti-
cle 2 of the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Third) of Contracts, 73 IowA L. REV. 659
(1988).
23. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-210 (1990) (Delegation of Performance; Assignment of
Rights).
24. See id. § 2-302 (Unconscionable Contract or Clause).
25. Id. § 2-202. To respond to the growing use of electronic contracting in sales
and other commercial transactions, it has been proposed that the word "writing,"
defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(46), be replaced by the word "record," defined as a "dura-
ble symbolic representation of information in objectively perceivable form or suscepti-
ble to reduction to objectively perceivable form." This definition includes transactions
reduced to writing and transactions using only electronically based communications
and information storage. See Patricia B. Fry, X Marks the Spot: New Technologies
Compel New Concepts for Commercial Law, 26 LOY. LA. L. REV. 607, 612-16 (1993).
26. U.C.C. § 2-208 (1990).
27. Id. § 2-210.
28. See id. § 1-103; Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It. Does for the Past, 26 LA. L.
REv. 285, 285-86 (1966).
29. See, e.g., Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (1st Cir. 1993) (relying on
Restatement §§ 24 & 59); Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 862
F.2d 1439, 1443-45 (10th Cir. 1988) (relying on §§ 26 & 27); Corinthian Pharmaceu-
tical Sys., Inc. v. Lederle Labs., 724 F. Supp. 605, 609 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (relying on §
24); Brown Mach. v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 419-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
1994] 1309
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2 and the "time-tested principles of common law"'° appears tohave worked rather well.
B. The Current Focus of the Revision
In this Article, I will discuss the current revisions to the sec-
tions most closely connected with contract formation and modifi-
cation in commercial sales, namely sections 2-201, 2-204, 2-205,
2-206, 2-207, and 2-209. First, however, I will provide a bit of
background.
1. The Influence of Transaction Types on the Principles of
Formation and Modification
The type or form of the sales transaction will influence both
the likelihood that disputes over contract formation and modifi-
cation will develop and the principles necessary to resolve those
disputes that do arise. For example, formation disputes are less
likely to arise when one party drafts the agreement and pre-
sents it to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or when the
parties, after negotiation, reduce the agreement to a final writ-
ing and sign it. Similarly, if the parties, contemplating electronic
contracting, enter into a trading partner agreement and thereaf-
ter buy and sell by computer, disputes over formation or modifi-
cation should be infrequent. Thus, where the form and method
of contracting structure the process by which the parties reach
an agreement, principles based upon the Restatement formula
should be adequate to resolve any disputes.
On the other hand, the less structured the sales transaction
is, the more likely a formation or modification dispute will arise.
In some transactions, the parties will agree on key terms of the
deal but exchange unread standard forms that vary the agreed
terms. In others, the parties may have a continuing bargaining
relationship that features some oral agreement, some writings,
and some mutual conduct. In still others, the parties may nego-
(relying on §§ 24 & 59); City Univ. of New York v. Finalco, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 244,
246 (App. Div. 1987) (relying on § 27).
30. Computer Network, Ltd. v. Purcell Tire & Rubber Co., 747 S.W.2d 669, 673
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
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tiate in stages toward a contemplated agreement or appear to
conclude a long-term contract but leave important terms open or
subject to further discussions.3' If one party withdraws from
the relationship, the formation issues can be quite messy,32 and
rigid formulas are often ineffective in resolving these issues.
When negotiations are less structured, disputes arising from
their breakdown require more flexible principles of formation
and modification.
2. Preserving the Policies and Displacement of Part 2
In revising Article 2, Part 2, the Drafting Committee has pre-
served the original approach to contract formation and modifica-
tion attributable to Karl N. Llewellyn." Under this approach,
creating an enforceable contract is easier rather than harder.
This approach minimizes formality, but when necessary, ex-
pands rather than limits the opportunity to contract. 4 The em-
phasis is upon flexible standards, mutual conduct, and the in-
tention of the parties. Thus, "conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of a contract" prevails even when the
parties have not satisfied the offer-acceptance formula, 5 and
the parties' intention to "make a contract" prevails even though
31. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987)
(concluding that present contract law is adequate to deal with today's complex bar-
gaining processes); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992)
(identifying necessary conditions for judicial involvement in completing contracts and
arguing that relational contracts rarely satisfy those conditions); Richard E. Speidel,
Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. LJ. L. REV. 789 (1993) (discussing
the need for changes in Article 2 to address the problems of relational contracts,
including contracts with open terms, reserved discretion, and multistage bargaining).
32. For examples of messy transactions, see SNACI, S.R.L. v. Illinois Found.
Seeds, Inc., 830 F.2d 90, 91-94 (7th Cir. 1987); Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's,
Inc., 761 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1985); Nebraska Builders Prods. Co. v. Industrial Erec-
tors, Inc., 478 N.W.2d 257, 264-65 (Neb. 1992).
33. See RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS: TEACHING
MATERIALS 477-99 (5th ed. 1993); Peter A. Alces, Roll Over, Llewellyn?, 26 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 543 (1993) (extolling the virtue of Llewellyn's drafting method).
34. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 (1990) (validating a "firm" offer in proper form even
absent consideration or reliance).
35. Id. § 2-204(1)-(2).
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"one or more terms are left open."3 ' Further, section 2-206 ex-
plicitly expands the manner and medium by which a party can
accept an offer,37 section 2-207 reverses the common law pre-
sumption that if the terms of an acceptance do not match the
terms of the offer, no contract is formed, 3' and section 2-209(1)
provides that an "agreement modifying a contract within this
Article needs no consideration to be binding."39 Part 2's use of a
broad definition of "agreement,"" rather than the Restatement's
foundation word "promise,"" and the fact that it does not ex-
plicitly require consideration to enforce a contract for sale or its
modification further reinforces Article 2's expanded concept of
contract.42
In addition to preserving this expanded concept of contract
formation, the Drafting Committee maintained the existing dis-
placement line between Code and common law formation princi-
ples. The Committee did not embrace more elaborate models of
contract formation, such as those found in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts and the Convention for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG).4" Article 2, Part 2 did not incorporate the pop-
ular reliance interest. Thus, in some cases, line drawing between
Code law and common law through the application of section 1-
36. Id. § 2-204(3).
37. See id. § 2-206 cmt. 1.
38. Id. § 2-207(1). Section 2-207 provides that a party may accept an offer by a
"definite and seasonable" acceptance, even though the acceptance contains additional
or different terms that vary from the offer. Id. But cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRAcTS §§ 58-59 (1979) (preserving the common law "mirror image" rule).
39. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1990).
40. Id. § 1-201(3). Section 1-201(3) defines "agreement" as "the bargain of the
parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances
including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in
[U.C.C. § 1-205 and U.C.C. § 2-208]." Id.
41. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1022 (1992).
42. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 1-2.
43. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Final Act,
Apr. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 9718, 19 I.L.M. 668, art. 14-24 [hereinafter CISG];
see John E. Murray, An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters
Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 8 J.L. & COM. 11 (1988). The Convention became effective in the United
States on January 1, 1988. John Honnold, The Sales Convention: Background, Sta-
tus, Application, 8 J.L. & COM. 1, 5 (1988).
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103 and sound Code methodology remains necessary. If the dis-
pute involves the common law, differences between common law
and Code policies must be resolved by the courts.
3. The Hub and Spoke Proposal
Why preserve the line between Code law and the common law
of contract formation and modification? One answer is based on
the judgment that the Restatement formula is adequate for the
structured sales contract and that Part 2's flexible approach
responds well to the less structured agreement. From the per-
spective of form and structure, Code law and common law com-
plement each other. Conflicts can be resolved by responding to
the type of transaction involved and resorting to equitable prin-
ciples when needed.
Another, more pessimistic, answer is that no one is sure ex-
actly how to draw that line. Unless the need for codification is
clear when it arises, line drawing is more or less hit or miss.
This uncertainty, among other things, may explain the current
interest in the so-called "hub and spoke" approach to revising
Article 2.
Under the "hub and spoke" concept, revised Article 2 would
encompass three transactions involving the transfer of interests
in personal property. The first is the sale of goods, which Article
2 now governs," the second is the lease of goods, which Article
2A now governs,45 and the third is the transfer of intangibles,
such as data, technology, and other intellectual property.46 The
objective of this approach is to state principles common to all
transactions in the "hub" and to state principles unique to each
transaction in the "spoke."
Contract formation principles are likely candidates for the
"hub," but lines must still be drawn. For example, three ques-
tions need to be asked and answered in the "hub and spoke"
44. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990).
45. Id. § 2A-102.
46. And, more generally, service contracts. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Service Con-
tracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 725 (1993)
(calling for a revision of Article 2 that would include transfers of intangibles and
service contracts).
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game. First, which common law formation principles applicable
to all exchange transactions are appropriate for sales, leases,
and intangible transfers and, therefore, need not be codified at
all? In other words, when can one rely exclusively on the com-
mon law or the Restatement formula in resolving formation is-
sues? Second, which formation principles are unique to sales,
leases, and intangible transfers but not to other exchange trans-
actions? These principles, when identified, need to be included in
the "hub." Third, which principles are unique to one or more, but
not all, of the three transactions and need to be put in a
"spoke?"
The answers to these daunting questions are far from clear.
All require more information about the frequency and types of
transactions than presently available. Take the "battle of the
forms," for example. Should U.C.C. section 2-207 be in the "hub"
or the sales "spoke?" The answer depends upon whether U.C.C.
section 2-207 is also appropriate for leases of goods ahd trans-
fers of intangibles, and the question of appropriateness further
depends in part upon a judgment about the dominant form and
structure of the transaction (how likely is it that standard forms
will be exchanged and not read?) and the capacity of the parties
engaged in the agreement process (what is the risk of unfair
surprise?).
Article 2A does not have a provision comparable to section
2-207. Presumably, such a provision is unnecessary because
most lessors highly structure leases of goods, thereby reducing
the risk of a "battle of forms." Another implicit judgment is that
either the parties should be responsible for reading and evaluat-
ing the forms or that the general provision on unconscionable
contracts can neutralize the risk of unfair surprise.17 All of
47. U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1990). Revised Article 2 will contain, in all probability, more
provisions regulating the consumer transaction. The current Article 2 has special
rules for merchants but treats everyone else more or less the same. See, e.g., id. §§
2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207, 2-209. The questions currently under consideration with re-
spect to the consumer are: (1) which consumer issues need more direct regulation;
(2) what form that regulation should take, declaring a specific clause inoperative or
insuring that the individual has adequate information and choice; and (3) what rem-
edies should be available to the consumer. A related question is whether small busi-
nesses that do not fall under the strict definition of "consumer" should receive spe-
cial protection. Because a prime candidate for abuse is the standard form, non-
1314
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these issues remain open to debate, including whether U.C.C.
section 2-207 should apply to transfers of intangible property.
Against this background, the remainder of this Article will
discuss the current status of contract formation and modification
under the December 1993 draft of revised Article 2, Part 2.
III. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
A. Statute of Frauds: Section 2-201
Failure to satisfy the statute of frauds is a defense to an oth-
erwise enforceable contract or modification.48 The statute of
frauds requires a signed "sufficient" writing by the party against
whom enforcement is sought, unless one of the stated exceptions
applies.4 9 The PEB Study Group recommended that the statute
of frauds either be repealed or revised." The Drafting Commit-
tee decided to repeal the statute, thus bringing Article 2 into
line with the British Sale of Goods Act51 and the CISG 2 Re-
peal of the statute of frauds also frees from application of the
statute (1) a sales contract or modification "not capable of per-
formance within one year of its making" and (2) modifications
that otherwise would be within its provisions."
negotiated contract prepared by one party, a potential solution to some problems
wherever such forms are used is to draft a new section dealing with form contracts.
48. Id. § 2-201(1).
49. Section 2-201(1) imposes the basic requirement of a signed "sufficient" writing.
Id. § 2-201(1). Between merchants, if a party receiving a written confirmation of the
contract fails to object within a stated time limit, the contract meets the writing
requirement. Id. § 2-201(2). The statute provides three exceptions: (1) "specially man-
ufactured" goods; (2) admission that a contract was made in "pleading, testimony or
otherwise in court;" and (3) part performance. Id. § 2-201(3). The courts are divided
on whether "promissory estoppel" is a nonstatutory exception. See WHrrE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 15, § 2-5.
50. See Appraisal, supra note 1, at 1035; Executive Summary, supra note 2, at
1874.
51. See Sale of Goods Act, 1979, § 4 (Eng.). The Sale of Goods Act contains no
statute of frauds and provides that "a contract of sale may be made in writ-
ing . . , or by word of mouth, or partly in writing and partly by word of mouth,
or may be implied from the conduct of the parties." Id. § 4(1).
52. See CISG, supra note 43, art. 11 ("A contract of sale need not be concluded in
or evidenced by writing. .. ").
53. The Committee also proposes repeal of U.C.C. § 2-209(3).
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A major assumption, derived from litigated cases in which
courts permitted the defense even though the parties clearly
made some contract,54 is that the statute of frauds creates more
problems than it solves. Other assumptions are that the modern
fact finding process can distinguish adequately between real and
perjured claims55 and that repeal of the statute will not dis-
courage the healthy habit of reducing agreements to writing. Fi-
nally, repeal of the statute could facilitate the growth of comput-
er contracting by eliminating the need to find a signed writing
in the electronic jungle.
One consequence of repeal is that a quantity term not found
in a signed writing is enforceable if the party seeking enforce-
ment proves that the agreement otherwise exists.56 However,
no default rule supplies a "reasonable" quantity term if the par-
ties have failed to agree. Thus, if the parties have intended to
conclude a contract, but the plaintiff cannot prove what quantity
they agreed upon, the contract fails for indefiniteness.57
Another consequence involves oral agreements followed by a
written confirmation. If the oral agreement is otherwise enforce-
able as a contract, the written confirmation adds nothing to the
formation analysis; it is not needed to satisfy the statute of
frauds." The writing, however, might be an offer if the oral
54. A particularly egregious example is Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635
P.2d 103 (Wash. 1981). But see Nebraska Builders Prods. Co. v. Industrial Erectors,
Inc., 478 N.W.2d 257 (Neb. 1992) (finding admission of contract).
55. Based on this argument, the Drafting Committee rejected an alternative pro-
posal that would have provided that parties seeking to prove the existence and
terms of an oral contract must prove them by clear and convincing evidence rather
than by a preponderance of the evidence. See Appraisal, supra note 1, at 1038-39.
The Committee rejected a similar proposal for parties seeking to prove terms agreed
in negotiations but not contained in the final writing under § 2-202. The ABA Task
Force could not agree on whether repeal of the statute of frauds was appropriate.
See Appraisal, supra note 1, at 1039. This uncertainty also appears in WHrrE &
SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 2-8.
56. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) limits enforcement to the "quantity of goods shown in such
writing" and U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) limits enforcement when a contract is admitted in
court to the "quantity of goods admitted."
57. See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1990). Freed from the restrictions of § 2-201(1), a prior
course of dealing or usage of trade may now provide sources of agreement on quan-
tity. See Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Lower & Co., 770 P.2d 692, 696-97 (Wyo. 1989)
(allowing evidence of usage of trade to supplement the terms of the agreement).
58. See U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1990) (stating when a writing in confirmation of an
1316
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agreement did not constitute a contract or might be an offer to
modify if there was a contract and the writing contained varying
terms.59
B. Firm Offers: Section 2-205
An option contract is an enforceable promise to hold an offer
open for a period of time.60 The option may be enforceable be-
cause it is supported by consideration or because it induced sub-
stantial reliance." A "firm" offer under section 2-205 is an offer
irrevocable by statute when made by a merchant and if the re-
quired formalities are met.62
The Study Group made no recommendation to revise section
2-205, 3 noting only that the comments should clarify that writ-
ten firm offers are in addition to rather than in lieu of options
created by consideration or reliance.' The Drafting Committee,
however, concluded that the risk of unfair surprise created
where a "term of assurance" is found "on a form supplied by the
offeree" should be neutralized by requiring that the term be
"conspicuous" rather than "separately signed by the offeror."65
The Drafting Committee assumed that because firm offers ap-
pear primarily in commercial sales, the conspicuous requirement
was sufficient to alert prospective offerees to form terms sup-
otherwise unenforceable contract satisfies the statute).
59. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) now provides that a "written confirmation which is sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those ... agreed upon." The phrase "those...
agreed upon" presumably refers to an oral agreement that is either not enforceable
as a contract because of the statute of frauds or dependent upon a final reduction to
writing. If the statute of frauds is repealed and the oral agreement is otherwise en-
forceable, the written confirmation with varying terms cannot be an "acceptance" of
the previously agreed terms. Rather, it should be treated as either a repudiation of
or an offer to modify the contract. See Miller v. Newsweek, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 85.2,
855-58 (D. Del. 1987) (holding a confirmation to be an offer to modify).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1979).
61. Id. § 87.
62. See U.C.C. § 2-205 (1990).
63. Appraisal, supra note 1, at 1051. Very little litigation involves § 2-205. Accord-
ing to the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service, only five reported decisions
have cited U.C.C. § 2-205 since 1985. See [UCC Sections 2-201 to 2-210] UCC Case
Dig. (Callaghan) 2205 (Supp. 1993).
64. See Appraisal, supra note 1, at 1051-52.
65. U.C.C. § 2-205 (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
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plied by the offeree. The Committee thought the "separate" sign-
ing requirement was unduly cumbersome and subject to
abuse.6"
C. Formation in General: Section 2-204
Although in general the Drafting Committee approved the
formation principles in section 2-204, the Committee revised it
somewhat in the interest of clarity and completeness.
The Restatement's formula, Offer plus Acceptance plus Consid-
eration equals Contract,67 is implicit in section 2-204(1), which
provides that a "contract for sale of goods may be made in any
manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract."' The
key word is "agreement," defined as the "bargain... in fact" of
the parties.6 9 In Article 2, "bargain" suggests both the presence
of consideration"° and that an agreed exchange of goods for a
price has been manifested, either by an offer and acceptance"'
or conduct by both parties "recogniz[ing] the existence of... a
contract."72
The Drafting Committee, however, has revised former section
2-204(2)"3 to read:
If the parties so intend, an agreement is sufficient to make a
contract for sale even if the moment of the making of the
66. In addition, the Drafting Committee decided to retain the three month time
limit on the duration of a firm offer where no time was stated expressly. Id. The
Committee deemed this statutory limitation on duration appropriate where the firm
offer was enforceable because of form rather than because the other party paid for
it.
67. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
68. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1990).
69. Id. § 1-201(3) (emphasis added).
70. In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "bargain" is defined as an
.agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to
exchange performances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1979). "Consid-
eration" is defined as something "bargained for." Id. § 71(1).
71. See, e.g., Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 862 F.2d
1439, 1444-45 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding an offer and acceptance through an exchange
of documents despite a lack of mutual conduct recognizing the existence of a con-
tract).
72. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1990).
73. The revised section is § 2-204(b).
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agreement is not determined, one or more terms are left open
or to be agreed, or the writings or records of the parties con-
tain varying terms as defined in Section 2-207(a).7 4
This preserves the intention test from former section 2-204(3)
and identifies three "even if' circumstances that might otherwise
preclude contract formation under the Restatement formula. The
first circumstance was found in former section 2-204(2), the sec-
ond was found in former section 2-204(3), and the third, making
an explicit reference to revised section 2-207, is new.
Building on this, former section 2-204(3)7s now reads:
If a contract for sale is made and one or more terms in the
agreement are left open, the contract does not fail for indefi-
niteness if there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an
appropriate remedy.7"
Again, this formulation recognizes that the parties may intend
to conclude a bargain even though some material terms are left
open, but makes enforcement depend upon the content of the
"gap filler" rules found in Article 2, Part 3. The revised section
recognizes also that one party can prevent contract formation by
indicating that unless the parties reach some further agreement,
no deal will exist.
In sum, revised section 2-204(a) states the "manner" in which
a contract for sale may be made, revised section 2-204(b) con-
firms that the parties can intend to contract even though the
agreement process includes apparent gaps or uncertainties, and
revised section 2-204(c) provides a test to save contracts with
open terms from indefiniteness. These revisions preserve, with
more clarity, the policy toward contract formation found in the
74. U.C.C. § 2-204(b) (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
75. The revised section is § 2-204(c).
76. U.C.C. § 2-204(c) (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
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original section 2-204.7" Section 2-204(b) also adds a link to sec-
tion 2-207, the importance of which is discussed below.
D. Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract: Section 2-206
Section 2-206, like section 2-205, assumes that a party has
made an offer to buy or sell and deals with the method and
medium by which the other party may accept that offer."v The
terms of the offer or other circumstances may indicate unambig-
uously the particular method or medium of acceptance. In the
absence of clear limitations, however, section 2-206 provides a
broad basis for acceptance. v9 Offers are construed as "inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances."0 An "order or other offer to buy goods for
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as inviting accep-
tance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or
current shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods,""1 and
the beginning of a requested performance may be a "reasonable
77. Under the U.C.C., not all agreements are contracts but all contracts are
agreements. See U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1990). Former U.C.C. § 2-204 tended to mask
the critical policy question of why a particular agreement should be enforced as a
contract for sale. Subsection (1) dealt with the "manner" in which the contract could
be made; subsection (2) dealt with the effect on contract formation when the "mo-
ment" of the making of an agreement was undetermined; and subsection (3) suggest-
ed, improperly it would seem, that the test when terms are left open is whether the
parties "intended to make a contract." See Appraisal, supra note 1, at 1050-51. Nev-
ertheless, the core policy was that if the parties assent in any objective manner to a
bargain and that neither party intended that further agreement be reached before
performance could commence, the agreement was a contract and did not fail for
indefiniteness if there was a "reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy." U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1990). The revised U.C.C. § 2-204 preserves this core
policy.
78. See U.C.C. § 2-206 (1990).
79. See id. § 2-206(1).
80. Id. § 2-206(1)(a).
81. Id. § 2-206(1)(b); see also Corinthian Pharmaceutical Sys., Inc., v. Lederle
Labs., 724 F. Supp. 605, 609-11 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (varying quantity shipped without
notice that the shipment is an accommodation has the effect of accepting offer);
Charles M. Thatcher, Acceptance or Non-Acceptance by Seller's Prompt Shipment of
Ordered Goods on "Non-Conforming Terms:" The Unprovided-for Cases, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 205 (1988) (suggesting a revision to § 2-206 to handle cases where the seller
ships conforming goods on terms that do not conform to the buyer's terms).
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mode of acceptance." 2 Section 2-206 preserves the potential for
a greater number of contracts.
The Drafting Committee has made only one revision to section
2-206. Revised section 2-206(a)(1) provides: "(a) Unless otherwise
unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances: (1)
an offer to make a contract must be construed as inviting accep-
tance in any manner and by any medium reasonable under the
circumstances, including an expression of assent that contains
varying terms as defined in Section 2-207(a)."' This addition,
like the addition to section 2-204(b), implements the Drafting
Committee's 4ecision in the "battle of the forms" to separate
questions of contract formation from those involving the terms of
the contract. Sections 2-204 and 2-206 answer the former ques-
tions and revised section 2-207 answers the latter.
E. When Varying Terms Are Part of the Contract: Section 2-207
1. The Problems and Former Section 2-207's Imperfect
Solution
Section 2-207 is one of the most complex and frequently dis-
cussed" and litigated provisions" in Article 2. It responds to
the fact that some transactions include both negotiated or
"dickered" terms and standard form terms which one party pre-
pared and which the parties exchange and routinely ignore. As a
82. U.C.C. § 2-206(2) (1990).
83. U.C.C. § 2-206(a)(1) (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
84. See JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 50 (3d ed. 1990); WHITE
& SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 1-3; see also Caroline N. Brown, Restoring Peace in
the Battle of the Forms: A Framework for Making Uniform Commercial Code Section
2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L. REV. 893 (1991); John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the
"Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1986); John E. Murray, Jr.,
A Proposed Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 J.L. &
COMIM. 337 (1986); Corneill A. Stephens, On Ending the Battle of the Forms:
Problems with Solutions, 80 KY. L.J. 815 (1992). For international implications, see
Arthur T. von Mehren, The "Battle of the Forms": A Comparative View, 38 AM. J.
COMP. LAW 265 (1990).
85. Volumes 1 to 20 of the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service Second
Series show that 97 judicial decisions cited U.C.C. § 2-207. See [UCC Sections 2-201
to 2-210] UCC Case Dig. (Callaghan) 2207 (Supp. 1993). In the same time period,
the courts cited either § 2-204 or § 2-206 only 57 times, and 28 of those decisions
also involved § 2-207. See id. %% 2204, 2206.
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matter of practice, if not efficiency, the parties rarely read or
discuss the standard forms even though they contain terms that
vary from those actually agreed upon. In fact, many of these
standard form terms, such as warranty disclaimers, excluders of
consequential damages, and arbitration clauses, materially vary
both the agreed-upon deal and the standard provisions or "de-
fault" rules of Article 2. This variation provides incentives for
the self-interested drafter to include the "boilerplate" in the
contract without explicit agreement by the other party.
The reality of varying terms in the standard forms and the
opportunity for strategic behavior posed two recurring questions,
both of which section 2-207 attempted to solve.
a. Was a Contract Formed at All?
The first of these questions is when, if ever, a contract is
formed in the "battle of the forms." This question addresses the
formation issue.
The common law "mirror image" rule operated to prevent a
contract by offer and acceptance when the terms in the standard
acceptance form varied from that of the offer, but recognized
that a contract could be inferred from mutual conduct by the
parties.86 Thus, if Buyer made an offer to buy and Seller sent
an acknowledgment agreeing to some of Buyer's terms but in-
cluding terms additional to or different from those proposed, no
contract was created; the acknowledgment was a counteroffer. 7
If, however, Seller also shipped and Buyer accepted the goods, a
contract was created. Buyer's conduct of taking the goods with-
out objecting to Seller's varying terms was deemed to accept the
counteroffer with all of its terms."
Former section 2-207(1) reversed the mirror image rule by
stating that a "definite ... expression of acceptance ... operates
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 58 (1979).
87. Id. § 59.
88. This result was found in the infamous case of Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett
& Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), which achieved a common law result by ignor-
ing the language of U.C.C. § 2-207. See id. at 499-500. For additional discussion of
the common law rule and its perverse effects, see Union Carbide Corp. v. Oscar
Mayer Foods Corp., 947 F.2d 1333, 1335-36 (7th Cir. 1991); Gardner Zemke Co. v.
Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319, 321-24 (N.M. 1993).
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as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or
different from those offered... , unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms."89 Former section 2-207(3) then reinforced the mutual
conduct inference by providing that "[c]onduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to es-
tablish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract."" Thus, the scope for con-
tract formation in "battle of the forms" disputes was expanded,
even though the language of section 2-207 did not distinguish
between "additional" and "different" terms contained in standard
forms and those contained elsewhere.9
b. If a Contract Was Formed, What Are Its Terms?
The second and more important question was this: If a con-
tract was formed under subsection (1) or subsection (3), when, if
ever, did the additional or different terms become part of the
agreement? The inclusion question was important because the
inclusion of the terms in unread or ignored standard forms be-
cause of one party's apparent assent could result in unfair sur-
prise. The route to an answer depended on whether the contract
was formed under subsection (1) or subsection (3). Even if the
court was on the correct route to a solution, much confusion and
uncertainty lay ahead.
I will not discuss in detail the strengths and weaknesses of
section 2-207's solution to the inclusion question. Suffice it to
say that the apparent objective of section 2-207 was to exclude
standard form terms from the contract, however formed, unless
the parties had expressly agreed to these terms.92 In short, sec-
tion 2-207, as a particularized application of the general uncon-
scionability doctrine, was designed to fight unfair surprise
through the misuse of standard forms in commercial transac-
89. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1990).
90. Id. § 2-207(3); see also id. § 2-204(1).
91. Some courts, however, have made the distinction and given more weight to
terms in typed letters than to those in standard forms. See Westech Eng'g, Inc.- v.
Clearwater Constructors, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 190, 200 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
92. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (1990).
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tions.93 But the route to this result was tortuous, and nothing
gave clear guidance on when, if ever, the terms could be includ-
ed without unfair surprise.
For example, suppose that the seller's response to the buyer's
offer was a "definite" acceptance creating a contract under sec-
tion 2-207(1). The standard form contained an "additional" term
excluding consequential damages. Section 2-207(2) treated the
term as a proposal for an addition to the contract and it initially
did not become part of the contract in transactions not between
merchants.94 If the transaction was between merchants, how-
ever, the additional term became part of the contract, with three
exceptions. One exception, that the additional term "materially
alter" the offer, is satisfied here, so the clause excluding conse-
quential damages would not be part of the agreement. 5 But the
text of section 2-207 did not say when the material proposal for
addition could become part of the contract, leaving the answer to
the comments.96 Moreover, section 2-207(2) did not deal with
the question of "different"97 terms or when the offeror's stan-
dard form terms, if any, became part of the contract. These
omissions, along with others, have created an exceptional vol-
ume of litigation and scholarly commentary."
To illustrate the problem further, suppose that no contract
was formed under section 2-207(1), but the seller shipped the
goods and the buyer accepted them. Here, conduct by both par-
ties recognizes the existence of a contract. A court should apply
section 2-207(3) to determine the terms of the contract, but no
explicit statutory direction exists to do so. If section 2-207(3) is
93. As Judge Posner stated, you cannot avoid a material additional or different
term simply because it would result in hardship. Union Carbide Corp. v. Oscar
Mayer Foods Corp., 947 F.2d 1333, 1336 (7th Cir. 1991). But you can avoid it if it
was incorporated into the contract without "express awareness." Id. Under this anal-
ysis, the question is whether one party is unreasonably surprised by the inclusion. If
so, "hardship is a consequence, not a criterion." Id.
94. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1990).
95. Id. § 2-207(2)(b).
96. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 5.
97. A leading case, Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir.
1984), held (not without difficulty) that the different terms were not part of the
agreement, leaving the parties with the Article 2 "default" rules. Id. at 1578-80;
accord Gardner Zemke Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319, 325-27 (N.M. 1993).
98. See supra notes 84-85.
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applied, the standard form consequential damage exclusion,
initially at least, would not be part of the agreement: "In such
case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms
on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of
[this Act]. " " Section 2-207(3), however, leaves unstated when,
if ever, terms excluded because the writings do not agree can be
included subsequently. Presumably, they are included only when
the parties have agreed to them expressly, thereby neutralizing
the risk of unfair surprise. 0
2. The Proposed Solution in Revised Sections 2-204, 2-206,
and 2-207
a. Possible Solution Routes
For better or worse, the Drafting Committee assumed that
enough transactions existed in which parties exchanged unread
standard forms with varying terms to generate a continuing risk
of unfair surprise. The Study Group, the Drafting Committee,
and almost everyone else concluded that former section 2-207's
solution to when, if ever, a contract was formed and when form
terms should be included in the agreement was unsatisfacto-
ry.'0 ' The challenge was to develop a better solution.
Three main routes lead to a possible solution. The first retains
both the formation and inclusion questions within the scope of
an expanded and clarified section 2-207. This revision, although
still complex, clearly would answer or resolve the recurring
problems of interpretation that former section 2-207 produc-
es.
0 2
The second alternative moves the formation issues to sections
2-204 and 2-206, repeals former section 2-207, and leaves the
99. McJunkin Corp. v. Mechanicals, Inc., 888 F.2d 481, 486 (6th Cir. 1989).
100. See id. at 485-89.
101. See Appraisal, supra note 1, at 1054-67; Executive Summary, supra note 2, at
1874.
102. Earlier drafts of revised § 2-207 contained an Alternative A, which followed
this route. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (Discussion Draft Feb. 17, 1993). However, the Draft-
ing Committee, at its October 1993 meeting, directed that Alternative A be deleted
from subsequent drafts. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
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unfair surprise risk to general principles of unconscionability,
augmented, perhaps, by a new subsection dealing specifically
with the perils of standard form contracting. This route rejects
the assumption that the "battle of the forms" requires a particu-
larized solution and is consistent with the approach taken in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Article 2A of the U.C.C., and
the CISG.'0°
The third solution moves the formation issues to sections
2-204 and 2-206 and revises section 2-207 to deal exclusively
with inclusion issues. In short, if a contract with varying terms
is formed under section 2-204 or 2-206, revised section 2-207
exclusively answers the question of whether the varying terms
are included in the contract. The Drafting Committee chose this
route.
1 14
b. The Current Draft
The current draft implements the third solution and unfolds
in the following manner. First, the current draft substitutes the
phrase "varying terms" for "additional or different" terms and
limits "varying terms" to "those terms prepared by one party and
contained in a standard form writing or record."' 5 "Varying"
refers to the bargain proposed or agreed to, not the "gap fillers"
of Article 2 and includes both minor and material variations.
Varying terms not contained in standard forms are left for gen-
eral principles of inclusion and exclusion. The low risk of unfair
surprise when assenting to other terms does not justify special
treatment."'
Second, revised sections 2-204 and 2-206 determine whether
an agreement containing varying terms forms a contract. The
Committee has revised those sections to recognize the varying
103. See Christine Moccia, Note, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods and the "Battle of the Forms," 13 FORDHAM INTL
L.J. 649 (1990) (discussing how the CISG handles international "battle of the forms"
problems).
104. U.C.C. § 2-207(a) (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
105. Id.
106. See Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1115 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding § 2-207
inapplicable in cases where a party has changed a term such as quantity rather
than modified or supplemented the other party's boilerplate language).
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terms issue explicitly. Thus, revised section 2-204(a) states that
if the parties so intend, an agreement is sufficient to make a
contract even though the "writings or records of the parties
contain varying terms as defined in Section 2-207(a)." °7 Simi-
larly, revised section 2-206(a)(1) states that "unless otherwise
unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances...
an offer to make a contract must be construed as inviting accep-
tance in any manner and by any medium reasonable under the
circumstances, including an expression of assent that contains
varying terms as defined in section 2-207(a)."1"8 These stan-
dards will not eliminate litigation over whether parties formed a
contract despite varying terms, and in some cases none will be.
But if a contract is formed, the method or timing of formation
will not influence whether the varying terms become part of the
contract under revised section 2-207(c).
Third, revised section 2-207(c) deals with varying terms in-
cluded in any contract formed under sections 2-204 and
2-206.109 Although the Drafting Committee has not made a fi-
nal decision on the content of this subsection, the current draft
reveals the probable approach to the question of inclusion:
(c) Varying terms contained in the writings and other records
of the parties do not become part of the contract unless the
party claiming inclusion proves that the party against whom
they operate (i) expressly agreed to such terms, or (ii) assent-
ed to such terms and had notice of them from trade usage,
prior course of deal or performance. Except between mer-
chants, the burden of proof under this subsection is satisfied
by clear and convincing evidence."'
The objective here is to exclude all varying terms to which a
party apparently has assented by conduct or otherwise unless
the party claiming inclusion can neutralize the risk of unfair
surprise. That party's burden of proof turns on whether the
transaction is between merchants."
107. U.C.C. § 2-207(a) (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
108. Id. § 2-206(a)(1).
109. Id. § 2-207(c).
110. Id.
111. This change reverses the burden of proof required under the current U.C.C. §
19941 1327
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Obviously, there is no unfair surprise if a commercial party or
a consumer has "expressly agreed" to varying terms. But when,
under subsection (c)(ii), does a party assent to such terms with
"notice?""' When the party assenting knows or has reason to
know of the varying terms because of trade usage, a prior course
of dealing, or a course of performance,"' unfair surprise is not
an issue, and the courts should give effect to the party's objec-
tive manifestation of assent."'
Fourth, revised section 2-207(d) contains a catalogue of terms
included when a contract with varying terms is formed." 5
These terms include (1) those upon which the writings or records
agree, (2) varying terms included under subsection (c), (3) those
to which the parties have otherwise agreed, and (4) any supple-
mentary terms incorporated under "any other provisions of this
Act."116
2-207, in which the party opposing inclusion has the burden of proving that the
additional term should not be included. See Comark Merchandising, Inc. v. Highland
Group, Inc., 932 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (7th Cir. 1991).
112. See U.C.C. § 1-201(42) (1990).
113. See id. § 1-201(3).
114. See Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709 (7th Cir.
1987), which held that an additional term did not "materially" alter an offer under
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) absent unfair surprise and that an arbitration clause in the seller's
confirmation did not unfairly surprise the buyer when the arbitration clause was
found in nine previous transactions between the parties. Id. at 711-15. In short, in
this transaction between merchants the buyer had notice based upon a prior course
of dealing that the arbitration clause was probably in the tenth confirmation form
and was not unfairly or unreasonably surprised. See id.; accord Dixie Aluminum
Prods. Co. v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 785 F. Supp. 157, 160 (N.D. Ga. 1992). Subse-
quently, the Seventh Circuit recognized that repeated use of the same forms between
the parties might not give the other party reason to know of them. See Trans-Aire
Int'l, Inc. v. Northern Adhesive Co., 882 F.2d 1254, 1262 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989). The
Third Circuit refused to include form terms repeatedly present in prior transactions
unless some prior action between the parties indicated that the party seeking inclu-
sion did not intend to proceed unless they were included. See Step-Saver Data Sys.
v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 102-03 (3d Cir. 1991).
115. U.C.C. § 2-207(d) (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
116. Id. Under U.C.C. § 1-201(42) (1990), " '[tierm' means that portion of an agree-
ment which relates to a particular matter." "Terms" may be agreed when implied
from course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance. Id. § 1-201(3). Also,
terms may be supplied by the "gap fillers" in Article 2, Part 3. Revised § 2-207(2)
develops broad sources for terms of the agreement in § 2-207 and other disputes.
See Dresser Indus. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1451 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
terms under § 2-207(3) include any terms arising under the U.C.C., including those
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In sum, the proposed revisions of sections 2-204, 2-206, and
2-207 offer a simpler and more focused approach to the issues of
formation and inclusion posed by the "battle of the forms." The
Drafting Committee concluded that this route was clearly a bet-
ter solution than the current version of section 2-207, but
whether it is the best solution remains to be seen. The proof of
the pudding is whether the revision leaves the right issues to be
litigated in the courts and provides a disincentive to those who
would play "first shot" and "last shot" games with their standard
forms." More importantly, the blanket exclusion of varying
terms unless the contract satisfies the conditions of revised sec-
tion 2-207(c) should provide an incentive for those who wish to
include terms important to their self-interest to insure that the
other party is aware of these terms and agrees to them. The
proposed changes place a premium on negotiation and informed
consent rather than upon strategic behavior.
c. A Test Case
The facts of an important case, Step-Saver Data Systems v.
Wyse Technology,"8 illustrate the application of revised section
2-207. After tests, Buyer selected software that Seller developed
for use in an integrated computer system."9 Buyer then mar-
120keted the software to doctors and lawyers. Over an eight
month period, Buyer purchased and resold a total of 142 copies
of the software. 2' Buyer first would obtain a commitment from
Seller over the telephone to ship twenty units.2 2 Buyer then
would send a purchase order stating the items to be purchased,
derived from trade usage, course of dealing, or course of performance).
117. The phrase "first shot" means that terms in the offeror's standard form are
included when the offeree accepts the offer. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert
Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207,
68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1246-47 (1982). The phrase "last shot" means that terms in
the offeree's standard form are included when the offeree makes a counteroffer and
the offeror subsequently assents without objection. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 99. Nei-
ther strategy will work under revised § 2-207(c).
118. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
119. Id. at 94.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 95-96.
122. Id.
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their price, and shipping and payment terms, and Seller would
ship the software with an invoice repeating the purchase
terms.' 2 ' The software box top, however, contained a license
agreement that in some detail disclaimed all express and im-
plied warranties, limited the remedy for breach to the return of
any defective disks, and provided:
Opening this package indicates your acceptance of these
terms and conditions. If you do not agree with them, you
should promptly return the package unopened to the person
from whom you purchased it within fifteen days from date of
purchase and your money will be refunded to you by that
person."
In each case, Buyer opened the package, apparently ignored the
license, 2' and did not return the software.' 2 ' Later, Buyer al-
leged that the software program was defective and Seller ar-
gued, among other things, that Buyer was bound by the box top
license which disclaimed warranties and limited remedies. 27
Under revised section 2-207(a), the box top license constitutes
"varying terms." Under revised sections 2-204 and 2-206, a con-
tract could be formed at either of two points.'2' The earlier
point occurred when Seller shipped the software with varying
terms in response to Buyer's written purchase order 2' and the
later occurred when Buyer accepted the software upon delivery.
Either way, the parties formed a contract. The critical question,
therefore, is whether the varying terms in the form of a box top
license became part of that contract under revised section
2-207(c).
Note that the varying terms contain both substantive provi-
sions and an attempt to impose acceptance of the terms unless
123. Id. at 96.
124. Id. at 97.
125. It is not clear from the opinion whether the license was in conspicuous type
or Buyer actually read it.
126. Id. at 97-98.
127. Id. at 98.
128. U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-206 (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
129. An even earlier possibility was at the conclusion of the telephone conversation.
This possibility, however, seems unlikely on the facts.
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Buyer objects.' Under revised section 2-207(c), neither be-
comes part of the contract unless Seller proves that Buyer ex-
pressly agreed to them or assented (by performing without objec-
tion) with notice of them derived from, among other things, a
prior course of dealing.13' Because no evidence suggests that
Buyer "expressly" agreed to the terms of the license, the critical
question is whether Buyer knew or had reason to know of them
from the prior course of dealing and still failed to object. If so,
the box top license becomes part of the contract because Buyer is
not unreasonably or unfairly surprised.
Section 2-207(c) as revised is not entirely consistent with
Judge Wisdom's interpretation of existing section 2-207 in Step-
Saver. The opinion, which held that the box top license was not
included, develops a layered approach to the unfair surprise
issue. Buyer may know or have reason to know that varying
terms are present but be unfairly surprised to learn that Seller
intends to include these terms in the contract. First, the court
seemed to assume that the parties probably know what the
other's form contains and that both proceed with the transaction
"even if they know that the terms of their form [will] not be en-
forced.""2 Given this business reality, the court, like revised
section 2-207(c), would, at a minimum, require Buyer's express
assent to the varying terms before inclusion. Second, Seller
cannot condition the contract upon Buyer's assent to the terms
unless Seller demonstrates "an unwillingness to proceed with
the transaction unless the additional or different terms are in-
cluded in the contract."' A form provision in a box top license
will not suffice. Finally, in cases where the same varying terms
appear in prior dealings, the fact that Buyer had notice of them
is not enough. This situation says only that Seller desires that
the contract include the terms and that Buyer probably is not
surprised to know this. To incorporate the terms in the next
130. See Step.Saver, 939 F.2d at 96-97.
131. If the transaction is between merchants, a preponderance of the evidence sat-
isfies the burden of proof, otherwise the evidence must be clear and convincing.
U.C.C. § 2-207(d) (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
132. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 99.
133. Id. at 102.
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transaction, some prior "action with respect to the issue""
must have addressed those terms. Buyer must know, from that
prior action, that Seller is serious about including the terms. 3
Only then will Buyer have the notice that avoids unfair sur-
prise.13
6
If this reasoning is sound, the inclusion test in revised section
2-207(c) should be limited to "express assent." If Seller is unwill-
ing or unable to obtain a negotiated agreement including vary-
ing terms, Buyer may ignore them.
F. Modification, Rescission, and Waiver: Section 2-209
Section 2-209(1) provides that an "agreement modifying a
contract within this Article needs no consideration to be bind-
ing," 117 and comment 2 states that a modification "must meet
the test of good faith imposed by this Act." 31 Section 1-203 im-
poses an obligation of good faith on the "performance or enforce-
ment" of a contract or duty. 9 Because modification of a con-
tract does not fit clearly under "performance or enforcement,"
revised section 2-209(a) provides that a "good-faith agreement
modifying a contract under this Article is binding without con-
sideration."'40 The Drafting Committee has yet to agree on a
revised definition of good faith for the U.C.C. or Article 2.''
The relationship between the duty of good faith and the law of
duress remains subject to development by the courts.
The repeal of the statute of frauds ends concerns about wheth-
er the "contract as modified" is within the statute of frauds.'
4 2
The Committee, therefore, has deleted former section 2-209(3).
The Drafting Committee, however, concluded that commercial
parties at least should have power to create a statute of frauds
134. Id. at 103.
135. Id. at 104.
136. Id.
137. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1990).
138. Id. § 2-209 cmt. 2.
139. Id. § 1-203.
140. U.C.C. § 2-209(a) (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993). The PEB Study Group
recommended this change. Appraisal, supra note 1, at 1068.
141. For some possible definitions, see Speidel, supra note 31, at 795-98.
142. U.C.C. § 2-209(3) (1990).
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for modifications by contract, provided that they clearly stated
the conditions for a subsequent waiver of that term. Revised sec-
tion 2-209(b), therefore, provides that "between merchants a
signed agreement that excludes modification or rescission except
by a signed writing or record may not be otherwise modified or
rescinded." 43 This "no oral modification" (NOM) clause, howev-
er, is subject to revised section 2-209(c), which provides that a
party may not assert a NOM clause valid unde subsection (b)
"if that party's language or conduct in effecting a modification or
rescission is inconsistent with the such term and induces the
other party to change its position reasonably and in good
faith.,,14
To illustrate, suppose a written contract under which the
seller is to deliver in installments includes a NOM clause. Both
parties are merchants, but the buyer insisted on inclusion of the
clause. Later, the parties orally agree to modify the contract
delivery schedule and the seller performs according to that oral
agreement. The buyer could have insisted that the modification
be in writing but did not. Assuming that the oral modification is
enforceable under revised section 2-209(a), the NOM clause is
not enforceable against the seller under revised section 2-209(c)
because of what might be called a "reliance" waiver. In effect,
the buyer is estopped from invoking the NOM clause for a past
performance by the seller under the oral modification. The same
result would follow if the buyer had stated "I will not insist upon
the NOM clause in the future" and the seller reasonably had
relied upon this statement in good faith. In either case, the
NOM clause does not apply because of reliance waiver, and the
oral modification is enforceable. 145
Revised section 2-209(d) addresses the issue of waiver as a
modification or rescission in other cases. 46 Except for the al-
143. U.C.C. § 2-209(b) (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
144. Id. § 2-209(c).
145. This revision is consistent with the majority opinion in Wisconsin Knife Works
v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1286-89 (7th Cir. 1986). For relevant
commentary, see Douglas K. Newell, Cleaning up U.C.C. Section 2-209, 27 IDAHO L.
REv. 487 (1990-1991); John E. Murray, Jr., The Modification Mystery: Section 2-209
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
146. See U.C.C. § 2-209(d) (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
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leged waiver of an executory portion of the contract, for which
reasonable reliance in good faith is required, the definition of
waiver is left to the courts to interpret under the common law.
To illustrate, suppose that the buyer is entitled to notice from
the seller before the goods are shipped and that this is an ex-
press condition to the buyer's duty to accept the goods. After
several installments the seller ships the goods without notice,
but the buyer accepts them anyway. By its conduct, the buyer
has elected to waive the condition and cannot object later to its
failure. On the other hand, if the buyer stated to the seller "you
don't have to give notice for future deliveries," there would be
power to reinstate the notice condition under revised section
2-209(d) "unless the other party has changed its position in good
faith, reasonable reliance on the waiver."4 '
IV. CONCLUSION
At this stage in the revision of Article 2, Part 2, one can de-
tect some probable outcomes, some sources of controversy, and
an area of uncertainty.
The probable outcomes protect the expanded conception of
contract formation and modification of the original Article 2 and
preserve the current line drawn between Code and common law.
Following this course, the purpose of proposed revisions in sec-
tions 2-204, 2-205, 2-206, and 2-209 is improved clarity and style
rather than substance. Issues that the revised statute does not
displace will be resolved under the "time-tested" bargain orient-
ed principles of the common law.
The sources of controversy include the recommended repeal of
the statute of frauds and the revision of section 2-207. The for-
mer removes a formal requirement to contract enforcement and
the latter focuses on the problem of unfair surprise in the "battle
of the forms." Disagreements in this area, therefore, will be of a
different order and kind. Nevertheless, alternative solutions
should be kept in mind. For example, if the statute of frauds is
repealed, why not develop new controls where parties seek to
prove agreements not contained in a writing or records? Why not
147. Id.
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require proof by clear and convincing evidence? Similarly, in-
stead of revising section 2-207, why not replace it with a provi-
sion dealing with standard form contracting that is broad
enough to cover every case of formation and modification involv-
ing commercial and consumer parties?
The area of uncertainty is the proposed "hub and spoke" re-
structuring of Article 2. Should it be implemented and, if so,
what will be the impact on the revision of the sales provisions in
general and the contract formation and modification principles
in particular? One can perceive only dimly the complexities
involved in moving from a common law to a civil law code, decid-
ing what goes in the "hub" and what goes in a "spoke," and con-
fronting transactions that transfer information technology
The ancient curse clearly had Reporters in nnd: May we live
in interesting times.
